BYU Law Review
Volume 2007 | Issue 2

Article 4

5-1-2007

Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Extending the
Rationale of Hudson v. Michigan to Evidence
Seized During Unauthorized Nighttime Searches
Jeffiy R. Gittins

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Jeffiy R. Gittins, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Extending the Rationale of Hudson v. Michigan to Evidence Seized During Unauthorized
Nighttime Searches, 2007 BYU L. Rev. 451 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2007/iss2/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

GITTINS.PP2

4/5/2007 11:16:39 AM

Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Extending the
Rationale of Hudson v. Michigan to Evidence Seized
During Unauthorized Nighttime Searches
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court first introduced the
exclusionary rule.1 Under this rule, evidence obtained pursuant to an
unreasonable search and seizure under Fourth Amendment standards
cannot be used in subsequent criminal trials.2 Since that time, courts
struggled to determine when application of the exclusionary rule was
the correct remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation. One such
struggle concerned the “knock-and-announce” rule, which requires
law enforcement officials to announce their identity and purpose
before forcibly entering a private residence to execute a warrant.3
Although the Supreme Court held that a violation of the knock-andannounce rule was a factor in determining the reasonableness of a
search,4 the Court did not clarify whether or not the exclusionary
rule should apply to such violations. The result was that some courts
suppressed evidence obtained in knock-and-announce violation
cases,5 while other courts did not.6
Finally, in 2006, the Court clarified the issue in Hudson v.
Michigan.7 In Hudson, the Court held that because the purposes of
the knock-and-announce rule did not include preventing the
government from taking evidence described in a valid search warrant,
1. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see also Shauhin A. Talesh,
Note, Parol Officers and the Exclusionary Rule: Is There Any Deterrent Left?, 31 CONN. L. REV.
1179, 1182 (1999) (“In Weeks v. United States, the Supreme Court first applied the
exclusionary rule to criminal proceedings.”).
2. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
3. See United States v. Dunnock, 295 F.3d 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2002).
4. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Bruno, 398 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831–32 (S.D. Tex. 2005);
United States v. Sherman, 344 F. Supp. 2d 223, 233–34 (D. Me. 2004); State v. Ramos, 130
P.3d 1166, 1172 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005); State v. Anyan, 104 P.3d 511, 525 (Mont. 2004).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 336 F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 2003);
Commonwealth v. Wornum, 656 N.E.2d 579, 581 (Mass. 1995); People v. Stevens, 597
N.W.2d 53, 62 (Mich. 1999).
7. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
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the exclusionary rule was inapplicable to violations of the knock-andannounce requirement.8 Although the Hudson opinion clarified the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce
violations, the applicability of the rule in other contexts remains
unclear. One such situation involves nighttime searches. Since the
colonial days of this country, the “nighttime search rule” has
required that search warrants are to be executed during the daytime
rather than at night.9 Thus, the question remains whether or not the
Hudson decision affects the admissibility of evidence obtained during
an unauthorized nighttime search.10
This Comment argues that the rationale announced by the
Supreme Court in Hudson should be extended to violations of
nighttime searches.11 In other words, courts should hold that the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable to violations of the nighttime search
rule. This Comment reaches this conclusion by comparing the
common law history, statutory codification, and—most
importantly—the purposes behind the knock-and-announce rule and
the nighttime search rule.
Part II of this Comment explores the exclusionary rule, giving a
brief history of the Fourth Amendment, discussing early American
courts’ grounds for not excluding evidence obtained in illegal
searches, and discussing the development of the exclusionary rule
through Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part III explores the knockand-announce rule. This Part gives a history of the knock-andannounce rule in England and early America, discusses the
development of the rule through Supreme Court cases, and discusses
the background facts and the Supreme Court’s holding in Hudson.
Part IV discusses nighttime searches, including a discussion of the
history of nighttime searches in early America and a brief discussion
of case law regarding nighttime searches and the evidence seized in
such searches. Part V then applies the holding of Hudson to
nighttime searches to show that the exclusionary rule should not be

8. Id. at 2165.
9. See United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897–98 (3d Cir. 1968).
10. Throughout this Comment, the term “unauthorized nighttime searches” refers to
searches executed at night pursuant to a valid search warrant, although the search warrant
authorized only a daytime search.
11. This Comment’s analysis is limited to extending the Hudson holding to the
nighttime search context. An analysis of the “correctness” of the Hudson decision is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
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applied to unauthorized nighttime searches for the same reasons that
the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule should not be
applied to violations of the knock-and-announce rule. This Part
reaches this conclusion by comparing the origins, statutory bases,
and purposes of the knock-and-announce rule and the nighttime
search rule. Finally, Part VI gives a brief conclusion.
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The exclusionary rule provides that “evidence uncovered by
police in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ is excluded from a defendant’s
criminal trial.”12 The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter law enforcement officials from conducting searches and
seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens.13 This
Part presents the history of the exclusionary rule. The first Section
gives a brief history of the Fourth Amendment and the reasons that
the Framers included it in the Bill of Rights. The second Section
discusses the application of the Fourth Amendment in early America
and shows the early courts’ hesitance to exclude evidence, even if it
had been illegally obtained by law enforcement officers. The third
Section then discusses the birth of the federal exclusionary rule in the
twentieth century and the development of the rule through Supreme
Court cases.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment assures citizens of “[t]he right . . . to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”14 Many legal scholars, as
12. Patrick Tinsley et al., In Defense of Evidence and Against the Exclusionary Rule: A
Libertarian Approach, 32 S.U. L. REV. 63, 63 (2004) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV); see
also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (“The exclusionary rule has
traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct
result of an unlawful invasion.”). The exclusionary rule was famously summarized in Justice
Cardozo’s cynical statement that “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered.” People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
13. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (“The primary justification for the
exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment
rights.”); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (stating that the
exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect”).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in full:
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well as many courts, attribute the genesis of the Fourth Amendment
to two British practices that the colonists despised: the use of general
warrants and the use of writs of assistance.15
General warrants were used mainly in England and were
historically used “to search and seize any printing press or papers
critical of the King or Parliament.”16 General warrants “failed to
specify who or what was to be searched or seized, allowing
governmental officials to . . . search anything” that they wished to
search without individualized suspicion.17
Even more odious to the colonists were the writs of assistance,
which were commonly used by British officials in the early American
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
15. Talesh, supra note 1, at 1182 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s creation was a reaction
to the abuses of the general warrant by England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies.”);
see also O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1472 (10th Cir. 1989) (“It is axiomatic
that the Fourth Amendment was adopted as a direct response to the evils of the general
warrants in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies.”); Devon J. Goodman,
Casenote, Hoay v. State, A Look at the United States Supreme Court’s and Arkansas’s
Misapplication of the Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith Exception, 57 ARK. L. REV. 993, 996–
97 (2005) (“The United States Supreme Court recognized that the framers of the United
States Constitution gave birth to the Fourth Amendment in memory of the British practice in
the American colonies of issuing general warrants which allowed officers to search and seize
with virtually no regulation and no requirement of reasonableness.” (citing Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–27 (1886))).
16. Darren K. Sharp, Note, Drug Testing and the Fourth Amendment: What Happened
to Individualized Suspicion?, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 149, 152 (1997); see also Boyd, 116 U.S. at
625–26 (“Prominent and principal among these [abuses] was the practice of issuing general
warrants by the Secretary of State, for searching private houses for the discovery and seizure of
books and papers that might be used to convict their owner of the charge of libel.”).
17. Sharp, supra note 16, at 152; see also Mark Josephson, Note, Fourth Amendment—
Must Police Knock and Announce Themselves Before Kicking in the Door of a House?, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1229, 1230 (1996) (“General warrants authorized searches for
persons or papers not named specifically in the warrant.”). The English parliament declared
general warrants illegal in 1776. O’Rourke, 875 F.2d at 1473. It was during the Parliament
floor debates that William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, made his famous statement:
The poorist man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter;
the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
Id. (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 425
n.1 (7th ed. 1903)).
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colonies.18 Writs of assistance were a type of general warrant, but the
writs were more abusive than the general warrants used in England.19
The British implemented the use of writs of assistance in an effort to
discover smuggled goods.20 The writs gave revenue officers complete
discretion to search any home at any time for smuggled goods.21
James Otis, an American revolutionary, declared the writs of
assistance to be “the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law,
that ever was found in an English law book” because they put “the
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.”22 Thus, it
was in response to these abuses by the British Government that the
Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment in order to protect the
“sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”23
B. Lack of Evidentiary Exclusion in Early America
Although the Fourth Amendment grants protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures,24 the amendment “provides
neither a remedy nor a mechanism for prevention if a violation
occurs.”25 From the time of America’s independence until the early
twentieth century, courts did not exclude evidence from criminal
trials, even if it had been obtained by police during an illegal

18. O’Rourke, 875 F.2d at 1473.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625; O’Rourke, 875 F.2d at 1473; Josephson, supra note 17, at
1231 (“The writs authorized customs officials and their subordinates to search anywhere they
thought smuggled goods would be hidden and to break open containers suspected of holding
smuggled goods.”).
22. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625 (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 630; see also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (“[T]he
purpose of the Fourth Amendment [was] to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property.”); Goodman, supra note 15, at
997 (“Resistance to [general warrants and writs of assistance] and the principle that a man’s
house was his castle established the foundation for the Fourth Amendment’s principle that the
home should not be invaded by any general authority to search and seize.”).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. Talesh, supra note 1, at 1182; see also Patrick Alexander, Note, Pennsylvania Board
of Probation & Parole v. Scott: Who Should Swallow the Bitter Pill of the Exclusionary Rule? The
Supreme Court Passes the Cup, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 69, 69 (1999) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment “contains no explicit remedy for violations of a person’s right to be free from
unreasonable searches”).
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search.26 Courts were only concerned with whether or not the
evidence was probative; if the evidence was probative to determine
the guilt of the accused, the evidence was admissible, regardless of
how it was obtained.27 If the evidence proved the defendant’s guilt,
the government officials who illegally obtained the evidence had a
“complete defense against charges that the search was a violation of
the defendant’s rights.”28 Even the Supreme Court “continued to
apply the common law rule that evidence is admissible however
obtained” into the early twentieth century.29 Thus, in early American
law, there was no remedy available for the defendant who had
probative evidence offered against him that the government had
confiscated during an illegal search.30
C. The Birth and Development of the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule was judicially created in 1914 in Weeks v.
United States.31 In Weeks, the Supreme Court overruled prior

26. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 844 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No.
15,551) (“The law deliberates not on the mode, by which [evidence] has come to the
possession of the party, but on its value in establishing itself as satisfactory proof.”);
Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841), superseded by statute, MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 2B (West 1964) as recognized in Commonwealth v. Upton, 476
N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985) (“If the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the
warrant exceeded his authority, the party on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the
officer, would be responsible for the wrong done; but this is no good reason for excluding the
papers seized as evidence, if they were pertinent to the issue . . . . [T]he court can take no
notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a
collateral issue to determine that question.”); Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 64 (“At common
law, and continuing for one hundred years after the passage of the Fourth Amendment,
evidence of the defendant’s guilt was never excluded just because it was obtained illegally.”).
27. Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 64 (“The common law excluded evidence that was
tainted by unreliability or suspect probative value . . . but probative evidence, regardless of its
source, was admissible, since it tended to establish the truth, and, thus, help achieve justice.”);
Alexander, supra note 25, at 72 (“[T]hrough the nineteenth century, the improper seizure of
evidence did not affect its admissibility.”).
28. Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 65; see also id. (“[T]he common law not only did
not exclude illegally-obtained evidence, but it even allowed that evidence to retroactively justify
what would otherwise be an illegal search and seizure.”).
29. Id. (citing Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904)).
30. Alexander, supra note 25, at 72 (“[F]or more than a century after the ratification of
the Bill of Rights, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress created any remedy that would
prevent unreasonably seized evidence from being admitted at trial.”).
31. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see also Talesh, supra note 1, at
1182 (“In Weeks v. United States, the Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule to
criminal proceedings.”).
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common law jurisprudence and held that “the admission of
improperly seized evidence implicate[d] the Fourth Amendment.”32
Specifically, the Court held that a criminal defendant “could, prior to
trial, petition for the return of the property secured through an
illegal search and seizure by federal officers.”33 The goal of
protecting the integrity of the judiciary was the primary basis for the
Court’s decision.34 The Court felt that “it would be implicitly
condoning the use of illegally obtained evidence and
unconstitutional behavior if it allowed the trial court to admit as
evidence private documents . . . when no warrant had been
obtained.”35 In support of its holding, the Court stated that
violations of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights caused by
unreasonable government searches “should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts.”36 Additionally, the Court reasoned that if
there was no judicial remedy for unreasonable government searches,
then the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment “might as
well be stricken from the Constitution.”37 Thus, “the exclusionary
rule began to take form as the ‘remedy’ that gave meaning to the
Fourth Amendment.”38
The Weeks decision, however, was limited because it only applied
to federal courts.39 State courts were not bound to the exclusionary

32. Alexander, supra note 25, at 72 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398).
33. Talesh, supra note 1, at 1182 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398).
34. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92; Talesh, supra note 1, at 1182 (“The Court claimed
that not applying the exclusionary rule to such proceedings would compromise the integrity of
the judiciary.”).
35. Talesh, supra note 1, at 1182; see Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
36. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392; see also id. at 393 (“The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.”).
37. Id. at 393 (“If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”).
38. Alexander, supra note 25, at 74.
39. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398; Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 67 (“Originally, the
exclusionary rule applied only in cases involving the federal government, because the Fourth
Amendment restriction on unreasonable searches and seizures applied only to federal and not
to state officers.”); Goodman, supra note 15, at 998 (“While the Supreme Court in Weeks
required exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence, it only extended the exclusionary rule
to the federal government and its agencies, not to the states.”).
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rule, as they were “free to adopt their own rules of evidence.”40
Although most states had constitutional provisions similar to the
Fourth Amendment, the majority of the states “rejected the
exclusionary rule and continued to allow both civil and criminal
courts to consider all probative evidence.”41 States continued to hold
that the evidence was still “competent,” even if the police had
trespassed without a warrant.42 Although evidence that had been
illegally obtained by federal officers was not admissible in state
courts,43 federal courts were allowed to admit evidence that had been
illegally obtained, “so long as it was the result of a search by state
police and not federal officials.”44 This practice became known as the
“silver platter doctrine” because state officers could effect a
warrantless search and present the seized evidence to federal officials,
who could then use the evidence in the federal prosecution of the
defendant.45
In 1949, the Court took its first step in forcing the exclusionary
rule on the states. In Wolf v. Colorado, the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.46 However, Wolf did
not specifically require the states to adopt the exclusionary rule as the
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.47 The Court allowed the
states to “decide what practice would work best for them individually
in guarding against unreasonable searches and seizures.”48 The states

40. Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 67.
41. Id. In 1926, the New York Court of Appeals noted that forty-five states had
considered the exclusionary rule declared in Weeks, and thirty-one of the states had outright
rejected it. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
42. See, e.g., Defore, 150 N.E. at 586–87 (rejecting the exclusionary rule and holding
that a police officer who entered the defendant’s room at a boarding house without a warrant
“might have been resisted, or sued for damages, or even prosecuted for oppression,” but the
evidence was still admissible in trial).
43. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956).
44. Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 67 (emphasis omitted).
45. Goodman, supra note 15, at 999. This “silver platter doctrine” came to an end with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223–24 (1960).
46. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S.
643 (1961); see also Alexander, supra note 25, at 74 n.45 (“[I]t was not until 1949 that the
Supreme Court expressly held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposed the Fourth Amendment limitations on the states.”); Goodman, supra note 15, at 998.
47. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31–33; Alexander, supra note 25, at 74–75.
48. Goodman, supra note 15, at 998–99 (citing Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31–32); see also
Talesh, supra note 1, at 1183 n.23 (“[T]he Wolf decision . . . invited states to generate and
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could still reject the exclusionary rule and “instead utilize other
effective remedies, such as the threat of civil suits or
interdepartmental training and discipline, to deter Fourth
Amendment violations.”49
Twelve years later, however, the Court overruled Wolf in Mapp v.
Ohio and specifically mandated that state courts apply the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.50
The Court stated in its opinion that “all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court.”51 The Court required the
adoption of the exclusionary rule because it felt that the alternatives
were ineffective.52 Thus, the Court “close[d] the only courtroom
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in
flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct.”53
III. THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE
The knock-and-announce rule requires law enforcement officials
to “knock and announce their presence and authority prior to
effecting a non-consensual entry into a dwelling.”54 This Part
explores the history and development of the knock-and-announce
rule. The first Section discusses the rule’s development in early
British and American common law. The second Section then
explores the rule’s development through Supreme Court cases,
focusing specifically on the application of the exclusionary rule to
violations of the knock-and-announce rule. The third Section
discusses the recent Supreme Court case of Hudson v. Michigan, in
which the Court overruled its own precedent and held that evidence
develop their own procedures for addressing evidence which violated the Fourth
Amendment.”).
49. Alexander, supra note 25, at 74–75 (citing Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31).
50. Mapp, 376 U.S. at 657; see also Alexander, supra note 25, at 75 (“In 1961 . . . the
Court reversed its 1949 decision and held that the Constitution did require the states to adopt
the exclusionary rule.”); Talesh, supra note 1, at 1183.
51. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
52. See id. at 652 (stating that “other remedies have been worthless and futile”).
53. Id. at 654–55.
54. United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 198 (1st Cir. 2006); see also United States
v. Dunnock, 295 F.3d 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The knock and announce requirement . . .
generally requires police officers entering a dwelling to knock on the door and announce their
identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry.”).
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should not be excluded when law enforcement officers violate the
knock-and-announce rule.55
A. The Knock-and-Announce Rule in English and
Early American History
The knock-and-announce rule has common law roots that date
back over four hundred years.56 The common law requirement that
police officers knock and announce their presence before forcibly
entering a private residence can be traced to the landmark Semayne’s
Case of 1603.57 Semayne’s Case held that
[i]n all cases when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not
open) may break the party’s house, either to arrest him, or to do
other execution of the K[ing]’s process, if otherwise he cannot
enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his
coming, and to make request to open doors . . . for the law without
a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any
house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which
great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when
no default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of
which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that he would obey
it . . . .58

Although the writ at issue in Semayne’s Case was a civil writ, the
reasoning of the case was adopted in the context of criminal cases in
The Case of Richard Curtis.59 The knock-and-announce requirement
of Semayne’s Case was widely adopted by the English legal scholars of
the time,60 suggesting that the requirement “was a widespread
practice at common law during the Eighteenth Century.”61

55. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (2006).
56. Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New Approach to the
Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 687 (1993).
57. Semayne’s Case, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.); see also Garcia, supra note 56, at
687–88 (attributing the genesis of the knock-and-announce rule to Semayne’s Case).
58. Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195–96.
59. The Case of Richard Curtis, (1757) 168 Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (K.B.) (holding that
officers serving an arrest warrant could “break open doors, after having demanded admittance
and given due notice of their warrant”); see also Josephson, supra note 17, at 1236 (noting that
the Case of Richard Curtis is the “first reported application of the announcement requirement
in a criminal case”).
60. See, e.g., 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 116–17
(Prof’l Books 1971) (1736) (“If a justice of the peace issue a warrant to apprehend a felon,
who is in his own house, and after notice of the warrant and request to open the door it is
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The knock-and-announce rule was adopted in early American
case law.62 In fact, the rule “was embraced in the United States prior
to the ratification of the Constitution.”63 Before the Constitution
was ratified, ten states had already passed laws requiring law
enforcement officers to announce their purpose prior to forcibly
entering a house,64 and popular legal manuals noted that
announcement was required prior to forcible entry.65 After the
ratification of the Constitution and the Fourth Amendment, early
American cases continued to require announcement before forcible
entry was allowed.66 Congress codified the common law knock-andannounce rule in 1917 when it passed the Espionage Act.67 The
statute is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109 and states that
“[t]he officer may break . . . any part of a house, or anything therein,
to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and
purpose, he is refused admittance . . . .”68
B. The Development of the Knock-and-Announce Rule in Supreme
Court Jurisprudence: Applying the Exclusionary Rule
The Supreme Court first examined the knock-and-announce rule
in 1958 in the case of Miller v. United States.69 Miller involved a
warrantless entrance into an apartment that resulted in the arrest of
the defendant for violations of federal narcotics laws.70 The

refused or neglected to be done, the officer may break open the door to take him . . . .”); 2
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 86 (Garland Publ’g 1978)
(1721) (“[N]o one can justify the breaking open another’s doors to make an arrest, unless he
first signify to those in the house the cause of his coming, and request them to give him
admittance.” (capitalization altered)).
61. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1236.
62. Garcia, supra note 56, at 689.
63. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1237.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1238; see also Randall S. Bethune, Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and the
Knock-and-Announce Violation: Unreasonable Remedy for Otherwise Reasonable Search
Warrant Execution, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 879, 881 (2001) (“The principle of knock-andannounce was part of early American common law.”).
67. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, Tit. XI, § 8–9, 40 Stat. 217, 228–29 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3109 (2000)); Josephson, supra note 17, at 1239.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3109.
69. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); see also Josephson, supra note 17, at
1242.
70. Miller, 357 U.S. at 302–03.
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defendant argued that the arrest—and the resulting search of his
apartment—was unlawful because the police did not give notice of
their authority and purpose before they forced their way into the
apartment.71 The Court began its decision by noting that the knockand-announce rule is “deeply rooted in our heritage and should not
be given grudging application.”72 The Court then applied the rule
and held that the defendant “could not be lawfully arrested in his
home by officers breaking in without first giving him notice of their
authority and purpose.”73 Thus, because the police had invaded the
apartment without giving notice, the Court concluded that “the
arrest was unlawful, and the evidence seized should have been
suppressed.”74 Although the Court applied the exclusionary rule in
this case, it “did not apply a constitutional standard” for doing so.75
The Court next visited the knock-and-announce rule in Ker v.
California.76 Ker is the first Supreme Court case in which the Court
specifically addressed the constitutional considerations of the knockand-announce rule.77 The Ker Court was split four-to-four on the
issue of whether an unannounced police entry was reasonable under
Fourth Amendment standards.78 In his plurality opinion, Justice
Brennan stated that “[e]ven if probable cause exists for the arrest of a
person within, the Fourth Amendment is violated by an
unannounced police intrusion into a private home, with or without
an arrest warrant . . . .”79 Thus, the constitutional implications of the

71. Id. at 305.
72. Id. at 313.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 313–14.
75. Bethune, supra note 66, at 881–82.
76. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
77. Bethune, supra note 66, at 882; see also Garcia, supra note 56, at 693 (“The
Supreme Court recognized the constitutional dimension of the ‘knock and announce’ rule in
Ker v. California.”).
78. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1244.
79. Ker, 374 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). This statement was subject to
exceptions:
(1) where the persons within already know of the officers’ authority and purpose, or
(2) where the officers are justified in the belief that persons within are in imminent
peril of bodily harm, or (3) where those within, made aware of the presence of
someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are
then engaged in activity which justifies the officers in the belief that an escape or the
destruction of evidence is being attempted.
Id.
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knock-and-announce rule remained unclear. “[C]ommentators
believed that the Court had constitutionalized the knock-andannounce rule. However, courts split as to whether the knock-andannounce rule was constitutionally mandated.”80
Finally, in a unanimous decision in Wilson v. Arkansas,81 the
Court squarely addressed the question of “whether an unannounced
entry by police armed with a search warrant violates the Fourth
Amendment.”82 The Court began its opinion by noting that in
evaluating the scope of Fourth Amendment protection, it looks “to
the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
afforded by the common law at the time of the framing.”83 After
reviewing the common law history of the knock-and-announce rule,
the Court concluded that the “Framers of the Fourth Amendment
thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was
among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of
a search or seizure.”84 Thus, the Court held that “in some
circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”85 However, the Court
failed to address what these circumstances were, and instead “[left]
to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under
which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.”86 Additionally, the Court did not consider the State’s
argument that the Constitution does not require the exclusion of
evidence seized following the unannounced entry of the officers
effecting the search.87 The effect of this ruling was that state courts
split on the question of what was the correct remedy for violations of
the knock-and-announce rule.88 Was it suppression of the evidence
or something else? This question was resolved in Hudson v.
Michigan,89 discussed in the next Section.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Josephson, supra note 17, at 1246.
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
Josephson, supra note 17, at 1229.
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931.
Id. at 934.
Id.
Id. at 936.
See id. at 937 n.4; see also Josephson, supra note 17, at 1251.
See supra notes 5–6.
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
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C. Hudson v. Michigan: Detaching the Exclusionary Rule
In Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court faced the issue of
“whether violation of the ‘knock-and-announce’ rule requires the
suppression of all evidence found in the search.”90 In a 5-4 decision,
the Court held that application of the exclusionary rule to violations
of the knock-and-announce rule was unjustified.91 This Section
discusses the facts and procedural history of Hudson, followed by a
discussion of the Court’s majority opinion.
1. Facts and lower court holdings
Police obtained a search warrant to search Booker Hudson’s
home for both drugs and firearms.92 When the police executed the
warrant, they announced their entrance, but only waited three to five
seconds before forcibly entering the home.93 As a result of the
search, the police found a large quantity of drugs in the home.94
Additionally, cocaine rocks were found in Hudson’s pocket, and a
loaded gun was found next to where Hudson was sitting.95 Based on
the results of the search, Hudson was charged with unlawful drug
possession and unlawful firearm possession under Michigan law.96
Hudson moved the trial court to suppress all of the evidence
found during the search based on the argument that the police had
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by not waiting long enough
after their announcement before forcing entry into the home.97 The
State conceded that the police’s entry violated the knock-andannounce rule, but argued that suppression was not the correct
remedy.98 The state trial court granted the suppression motion and
dismissed the charges; however, the Michigan Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that “suppression is inappropriate” for a knockand-announce violation.99 The court based its holding on People v.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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Id. at 2162.
Id. at 2168.
Id. at 2162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2163.
Id. at 2162.
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Stevens, a 1999 Michigan Supreme Court case that held that a
violation of the knock-and-announce rule did not require
suppression of evidence because the evidence “would have been
inevitably discovered.”100 The Michigan Supreme Court denied
review of the case,101 but the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in 2005.102
2. Supreme Court holding
The Court began its opinion by noting that the knock-andannounce requirement “is an ancient one.”103 Following a brief
synopsis of its case law concerning the knock-and-announce rule and
its relation to the Fourth Amendment, the Court acknowledged that
the rule announced in Wilson “is not easily applied.”104 This was
followed by a brief discussion of the exclusionary rule, which the
Court noted “has always been our last resort, not our first
impulse.”105 The Court also noted that the exclusionary rule
“generates ‘substantial social costs.’”106 The Court asserted that the
police’s illegal entry “was not a but-for cause of obtaining the
evidence. Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the
police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and
would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house.”107
A major portion of the opinion focused on purposes of—or, in
the Court’s language, “the interests protected” by—the knock-andannounce rule.108 The first interest noted by the Court is “the
protection of human life and limb.”109 The rule protects this interest
because “an unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed
self-defense by the surprised resident.”110 The second interest is the
“protection of property.”111 The Court noted that the knock-and-

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, 62 (Mich. 1999).
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162.
Hudson v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2964 (2005) (mem.).
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162.
Id.
Id. at 2163.
Id. at (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).
Id. at 2164.
Id. at 2165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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announce rule “gives individuals ‘the opportunity to comply with the
law and to avoid the destruction of property occasioned by a forcible
entry.’”112 The final interest protected by the knock-and-announce
rule is the “privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden
entrance.”113 The announcement requirement “gives residents the
‘opportunity to prepare themselves for’ the entry of the police.”114 In
other words, it gives the individual time to “pull on clothes or get
out of bed.”115
The Court then noted the interest that the knock-and-announce
rule has never protected: “one’s interest in preventing the
government from seeing or taking evidence described in a
warrant.”116 The Court concluded that the exclusionary rule was
“inapplicable” because “the interests that were violated in this case
have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence.”117 The Court’s
ultimate holding in the case was that “the social costs of applying the
exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are considerable;
the incentive to such violations is minimal”; therefore, “[r]esort to
the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified.”118
The issue of whether or not to exclude evidence obtained during
a search in which police fail to follow the knock-and-announce rule is
now settled law. The Hudson Court made it clear that the
suppression of evidence is not the appropriate remedy for violations
of the knock-and-announce rule. Nevertheless, the appropriate
remedy for other search violations, such as violations of the
nighttime search rule, remains unresolved.
IV. NIGHTTIME SEARCHES
The general rule regarding the execution of search warrants is
that they should be executed during the daytime rather than the
nighttime.119 It is widely recognized that nighttime searches inflict a

112. Id. (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997)).
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5).
115. Id. (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2168.
119. See 79 C.J.S Searches § 266 (2006) (“Nighttime execution must be the exception
and not the rule.” (citing State v. Habbena, 372 N.W.2d 450 (S.D. 1985))); see also State v.
Lindner, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (Idaho 1979) (“Historically, there has been a strong aversion to
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greater invasion of privacy than do daytime searches.120 However,
courts vary in their interpretation of the correct remedy if police
effect an unauthorized nighttime search. This Part explores the
history and development of law relating to nighttime searches. The
first Section discusses the early history of the nighttime search rule.
The second Section discusses recent jurisprudence regarding
nighttime searches, including the Supreme Court decision in
Gooding v. United States.121
A. Nighttime Searches in Early American History
Even prior to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, “there
was a strong aversion to nighttime searches” in early American
common law.122 It appears that it was an early common law principle
to limit search warrants to the daytime.123 The general warrants
issued in England forbade nighttime searches,124 and “[e]ven the
Writs of Assistance, more odious and abusive than the general

nighttime searches.”); State v. Brock, 653 P.2d 543, 545 (Or. 1982) (“The most obvious and
fundamental policy of the statute [requiring daytime searches unless the issuing judge
specifically authorizes a nighttime search] is a legislative determination that execution of search
warrants during the day is to be normal and that nighttime searches are to be exceptional.”).
The definition of “nighttime” depends upon the jurisdiction. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3917 (2006) (between 10:00 p.m. and 6:30 a.m.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 2308 (2006) (between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.); MINN. STAT. § 626.14 (2006) (between
8:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.).
120. See, e.g., 1 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 24:7 (2006) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
PRACTICE] (“Most jurisdictions recognize that nighttime entry involves a significantly greater
invasion of privacy than its daytime counterpart.”); see also Lindner, 592 P.2d at 857 (“[E]ntry
into an occupied dwelling in the middle of the night is clearly a greater invasion of privacy than
entry executed during the daytime.”); State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Minn. 1978)
(“[A] nighttime search of a home involves a much greater intrusion upon privacy and is
presumably more alarming than an ordinary daytime search of a home.” (citing State v.
Stephenson, 245 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 1976))); State v. Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401, 410
(N.D. 1979) (“Courts have long recognized that nighttime searches constitute greater
intrusions on privacy than do daytime searches.”).
121. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974).
122. United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897 (3d Cir. 1968); see also
CRIMINAL PRACTICE, supra note 120, § 24:7 (“[A]t common law, prior to the adoption of the
Bill of Rights, there was a strong aversion to nighttime searches.”).
123. 79 C.J.S Searches § 265 (2006).
124. O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1473 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing 2
HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 113 (Stokes & Ingersoll eds. 1847)). For a discussion of general
warrants, see supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
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warrants, permitted searches of dwellings only in the daytime.”125
Early American revulsion of nighttime searches of private homes is
evidenced by the first Congress passing two laws forbidding the
practice.126 The sentiment shared by early Americans was that the
“[n]ight-time search was the evil in its most obnoxious form.”127
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Gooding v. United States
The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed
the issue of whether or not nighttime search violations implicate the
Fourth Amendment—as it did with knock-and-announce violations
in Wilson v. Arkansas and its progeny128—thus, there is no Supreme
Court guidance on whether or not the exclusionary rule should be
applied to nighttime search violations. The closest the Court has
come to addressing the issue was in the case of Gooding v. United
States.129 In Gooding, a criminal defendant argued that “evidence
offered against him at his trial should have been suppressed because
it was seized at nighttime in violation of governing statutory
provisions.”130 The defendant did not, however, argue that the
nighttime search violated the Fourth Amendment.131 Thus, the
Court resolved the case on statutory grounds and did not specifically
address the possible Fourth Amendment ramifications.132

125. O’Rourke, 875 F.2d at 1473; see also Boyance, 398 F.2d at 898 (“Even the odious
‘writs of assistance’ which outraged colonial America permitted search of dwellings only in the
daytime.”). For a discussion of writs of assistance, see supra notes 18–22 and accompanying
text.
126. O’Rourke, 875 F.2d at 1473 (citing Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43 and
Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 29, 1 Stat. 206).
127. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961).
128. See supra Part III.B.
129. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974); see also George E. Dix, Means of
Executing Searches and Seizures as Fourth Amendment Issues, 67 MINN. L. REV. 89, 101–02
(1982) (“The closest the [United States Supreme] Court came to addressing the time of
search issue was in Gooding v. United States, which involved the execution of a search
warrant.”).
130. Gooding, 416 U.S. at 431; see also Dix, supra note 129, at 102 (“Gooding argued
only that the issuance of the warrant did not comply with the applicable statutory provisions
regarding nighttime warrants.”).
131. Dix, supra note 129, at 102.
132. See Gooding, 416 U.S. at 458; see also Paul Morris, Case Note, Fouse v. State: The
Arkansas Nighttime Search Rule—Helping Make Arkansas the Country’s Number One Producer
of Methamphetamine, 53 ARK. L. REV. 965, 972 (2000) (“[T]he Court disposed of the case on
statutory grounds and never specifically addressed the constitutionality issue . . . .”).
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Nevertheless, Justice Marshall took the opportunity in his
dissenting opinion to discuss the constitutional considerations.
Justice Marshall stated that, in his opinion, “there is no expectation
of privacy more reasonable and more demanding of constitutional
protection than our right to expect that we will be let alone in the
privacy of our homes during the night.”133
The idea of the police unnecessarily forcing their way into the
home in the middle of the night . . . rousing the residents out of
their beds, and forcing them to stand by in indignity in their night
clothes while the police rummage through their belongings does
indeed smack of a “‘police state’ lacking in the respect for . . . the
right of privacy dictated by the U.S. Constitution.”134

Justice Marshall felt that a nighttime search was a “severe
intrusion upon privacy”135 and therefore required “a greater
justification.”136 Thus, it was Justice Marshall’s contention that the
nighttime search required “some additional justification . . . over and
above the ordinary showing of probable cause”137 because
“increasingly severe standards of probable cause are necessary to
justify increasingly intrusive searches.”138
Although the majority opinion in Gooding did not address the
constitutional considerations relating to the Fourth Amendment,139
the case “has been interpreted by other courts to say that the time of
search does not enter into a Fourth Amendment analysis.”140 Several
courts have held that nighttime searches have a “constitutional

133. Gooding, 416 U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-538, at 12 (1969)).
135. Id. at 463 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a more severe invasion of privacy than the
nighttime intrusion into a private home.” (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S 493, 498
(1958))).
136. Id. at 464 (quoting Brief for United States at 14, Gooding, 416 U.S. 430 (No. 726902)).
137. Id. at 462.
138. Id. at 464.
139. Dix, supra note 129, at 104 (“The opinion of the [Gooding] Court evinces no
sensitivity to or acknowledgment of constitutional considerations.”); id. at 105 (“Gooding
demonstrated an almost total lack of sensitivity to potential fourth amendment significance of
the timing of a search.”).
140. Morris, supra note 132, at 973; see also CRIMINAL PRACTICE, supra note 120,
§ 24:7 (“The Supreme Court has made it clear that the factor of a nighttime search is related
to the reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment.”).
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dimension”141 and that the issue of a nighttime search is “sensitively
related to the reasonableness issue” of the Fourth Amendment.142
However, other courts have held that a nighttime search of a private
residence raises only statutory—and not constitutional—
implications.143 Thus, while some courts have excluded evidence
obtained during an unauthorized nighttime search,144 other courts
have found various ways to avoid applying the exclusionary rule.145
141. See, e.g., State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn. 1978), overruled in part on
other grounds by Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (“Although the general rule
against nighttime searches is statutory, it may also have a constitutional dimension.”).
142. States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979); see also United States ex
rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897 (3d Cir. 1968) (“The time of a police search of an
occupied family home may be a significant factor in determining whether, in a Fourth
Amendment sense, the search is ‘unreasonable.’”); State v. Lindner, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (Idaho
1979) (“Searches of private dwellings executed during the nighttime take on additional
constitutional significance.”); State v. Garcia, 45 P.3d 900, 904 (N.M. 2002) (“Many
jurisdictions recognize that the decision to execute a search warrant at night may implicate
constitutional rights.”).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1124 (6th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he
particular procedures mandated before a night search may be conducted are not part of the
fourth amendment . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. 1992)
(“Many courts have specifically or by implication rejected the claim that the nighttime search
limitation has any basis in either State or the Federal Constitutions.”).
144. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 540 P.2d 1268, 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (“[T]he lack
of a showing by the state to justify the nighttime search forces us to say that the motion [to
suppress evidence] should have been granted.”); State v. Dalrymple, 458 P.2d 96, 98 (N.M.
1969) (“We conclude that a nighttime search is not authorized in the absence of appropriate
direction contained in the warrant and consequently the searches involved here were illegal and
unreasonable and the motion to suppress should have been granted.”); State v. Fields, 691
N.W.2d 233, 238 (N.D. 2005) (“We conclude the search was unreasonable because probable
cause for the nighttime warrant . . . did not exist. The evidence obtained as a result of the
unwarranted nighttime search must be suppressed.”).
Arkansas courts have seemed especially inclined to suppress evidence obtained in
unauthorized nighttime searches. See, e.g., Fouse v. State, 989 S.W.2d 146 (Ark. 1999);
Richardson v. State, 863 S.W.2d 572 (Ark. 1993); Garner v. State, 820 S.W.2d 446 (Ark.
1991); State v. Martinez, 811 S.W.2d 319 (Ark. 1991); Hall v. State, 789 S.W.2d 456 (Ark.
1990); State v. Broadway, 599 S.W.2d 721 (Ark. 1980); Dodson v. State, 199 S.W.3d 115
(Ark. Ct. App. 2004); Ramey v. State, 863 S.W.2d 839 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993). For a criticism
of Arkansas’s stance on nighttime searches, see generally Morris, supra note 132.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 1993) (“We need not
reach the question whether the nighttime authorization in the warrant was in fact reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment because we find that even if the nighttime search violated the
Fourth Amendment, the fruits of the search were admissible under [the Leon good faith
exception].”); United States v. Twenty-two Thousand, Two Hundred Seven Dollars
($22,287.00), U.S. Currency, 709 F.2d 442, 448 (6th Cir. 1983) (“[I]f this warrant was in
fact served after 10 p.m., it was very shortly thereafter and because, in our view, under the
circumstances presented here the exclusionary rule should not be applied even if it was served
shortly after the termination of ‘daytime’ . . . .”); United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1122
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V. APPLYING HUDSON TO NIGHTTIME SEARCHES

Because the knock-and-announce rule and the nighttime search
rule are very similar, the Court’s holding from Hudson v. Michigan
should be extended to nighttime search violations. In other words, if
the exclusionary rule is not the correct remedy for violations of the
knock-and-announce rule, then it is not the correct remedy for
violations of the nighttime search rule either. This Part compares the
two rules to show why the holding of Hudson should be extended to
violations of the nighttime search rule. The first Section compares
the early history of the rules and shows that unannounced entries
and nighttime searches were both disfavored by founding Americans.
The second Section compares the current statutory framework of the
two rules and shows the similarities between the operation of both
rules under statutory authority. The third Section compares the
purposes of the rules, focusing specifically on the protection of
interests enumerated in the Hudson decision. The final Section
summarizes the comparisons and concludes that based on the
similarities between the common law history, statutory codification,
and purposes of the two rules, the Hudson decision should also apply
to violations of the nighttime search rule.
A. Comparing the Early Histories
There is a strong correlation between the early common law
histories of the knock-and-announce rule and the nighttime search
rule. One similarity is that both rules were part of American common

(6th Cir. 1978) (“In this case, the defendant’s interests have not been violated, though the
procedures were not observed.”); Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 835 (“[W]e hold that the unjustified
granting of permission for a nighttime execution of the warrant was a statutory violation which
under the circumstances does not mandate exclusion of the evidence seized.”); State v.
Goodwin, 686 N.W.2d 40, 44 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (“We conclude that, while executing a
warrant less than two minutes before the applicable time for commencement of the search
warrant constitutes a statutory violation, the early execution is a de minimis violation and does
not justify suppression of the fruits of the search as a remedy.”); Garcia, 45 P.3d at 906
(holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and therefore suppression was not
required, because “the nighttime search . . . was conducted upon people who were observed to
be active in the nighttime”); State v. Brock, 653 P.2d 543, 547 (Or. 1982) (“It does not
follow that evidence seized in execution of the search warrant must be suppressed. . . . The
evidence could validly be seized in the daytime, and it could validly have been seized at night if
the judge had found the kind of circumstances for authorizing a nighttime seizure . . . .”).
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law even before the Fourth Amendment was ratified.146 This
similarity is important because the Supreme Court has stated that in
determining whether or not a search and seizure is reasonable, “[t]he
Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted.”147
In fact, both rules applied to the general warrants and writs of
assistance that prompted the colonists to adopt the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.148 Thus, even the most odious warrants in colonial times
were executed with announcement and were only executed during
the daytime. Additionally, both rules were adopted into early
American law, either by courts adopting the common law149 or by
statutes codifying the common law.150 Thus, by comparing the early
histories of the two rules, it is clear that both were important
common law rules that existed prior to the ratification of the Fourth
Amendment and both were more formally adopted into law very
early in America’s history.
B. Comparing the Statutory Framework
Several jurisdictions have enacted legislation related to the
knock-and-announce rule151 and the nighttime search rule.152 Such
146. See CRIMINAL PRACTICE, supra note 120, § 24:7 (“[A]t common law, prior to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, there was a strong aversion to nighttime searches.”); Josephson,
supra note 17, at 1237 (stating that the knock-and-announce rule “was embraced in the
United States prior to the ratification of the Constitution”).
147. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
148. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 52 (1963) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)
(“[S]ervice of the general warrants and writs of assistance was usually preceded at least by some
form of notice or demand for admission.”); O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465,
1473 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the general warrants in England forbade nighttime
searches and that “[e]ven the Writs of Assistance, more odious and abusive than the general
warrants, permitted searches of dwellings only in the daytime”).
149. Garcia, supra note 56, at 689 (“Early American case law adopted the view that
forcible entry into a home was lawful only after notice.”).
150. See United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897 (3d Cir. 1968)
(“During the early years of the republic this common-law tradition [of prohibiting nighttime
searches] was embodied in two statutes passed by our first Congress that authorized only
daytime searches.” (citations omitted)).
151. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-5-9 (LexisNexis 1995) (“To execute a search warrant, an
officer may break open any door or window of a house, any part of a house or anything therein
if after notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance.”); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1531 (West 2000) (“The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a
house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his
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statutes are often quite similar in that they require the executing
officers to follow the knock-and-announce rule and the nighttime
search rule, unless the issuing judge finds reasonable cause to “break
the rules.” To demonstrate these similarities, this Section compares
the Utah statutes that codify the knock-and-announce rule and the
nighttime search rule.
Section 77-23-210 of the Utah Code includes the
announcement requirement.153 This Section states that police cannot
use force to enter premises when executing a search warrant unless
“after notice of [the officer’s] authority and purpose, there is no
response or he is not admitted with reasonable promptness.”154
However, an issuing magistrate can issue a “no-knock warrant” if the
magistrate finds that “the object of the search may be quickly
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result
to any person if notice were given.”155 Thus, under Utah law, an
officer must follow the knock-and-announce rule unless the issuing
judge finds that there is reasonable cause for the officer to execute
the warrant without knocking and announcing.
Section 77-23-205 of the Utah Code includes the nighttime
search rule.156 This Section states that “[t]he magistrate shall insert a
direction in the warrant that it be served in the daytime.”157
However, the issuing magistrate can issue a nighttime search warrant
if “the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to believe
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 933.09 (West 2001)
(“The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of
a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of the officer’s authority
and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein.”).
152. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3917 (2001) (“Upon a showing of good
cause therefor, the magistrate may, in his discretion insert a direction in the warrant that it may
be served at any time of the day or night. In the absence of such a direction, the warrant may
be served only in the daytime.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1533 (“Upon a showing of good cause,
the magistrate may, in his or her discretion, insert a direction in a search warrant that it may be
served at any time of the day or night. In the absence of such a direction, the warrant shall be
served only between the hours of 7 a.m. and 10 p.m.”); FLA. STAT. § 933.10 (“A search
warrant issued under this chapter may, if expressly authorized in such warrant by the judge, be
executed by being served either in the daytime or in the nighttime, as the exigencies of the
occasion may demand or require.”).
153. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210 (West 2004).
154. Id. § 77-23-210(1).
155. Id. § 77-23-210(2).
156. Id. § 77-23-205.
157. Id. § 77-23-205(1). “Daytime” under Utah law is defined as “the hours beginning
at 6 a.m. and ending at 10 p.m.” Id. § 77-23-201(1).
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a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good
reason.”158 Therefore, under Utah law, a search warrant must be
issued during the daytime unless the issuing judge finds that there is
reasonable cause for the warrant to be executed at night.
The similarities between the statutory codifications of the knockand-announce rule and the nighttime search rule are thus readily
apparent. Both statutes require executing officers to obey the
respective rule contained in the statute, unless the issuing magistrate
finds reasonable proof that evidence would be destroyed or the
officers’ safety would be jeopardized. In these situations, both
statutes allow the magistrate to include an exception in the warrant,
thereby allowing the officers to either enter the residence without
announcement or serve the warrant at night.159
C. Comparing the Purposes
In Hudson, the Court discussed three purposes of the knockand-announce rule in an effort to show that applying the
exclusionary rule was inapplicable to protecting these interests.160
Two of these purposes—protection from violence and protection of
privacy and dignity—have also been cited extensively by courts as
purposes of the nighttime search rule. The third purpose cited by
Hudson—protection of property—has not been cited by courts as a
purpose of the nighttime search rule; however, the protection of
property can be legitimately viewed as a purpose of the nighttime
search rule. This Section discusses the three protections afforded by
the knock-and-announce rule, as pronounced in Hudson, and
compares courts’ statements regarding these protections in both the
knock-and-announce and nighttime search contexts.
158. Id.
159. As previously mentioned, these statutory similarities are not unique to Utah. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3915, 13-3916 (2001) (requiring executing officers to
announce their authority and purpose before entering, unless the magistrate has “authorized
an unannounced entry”); id. § 13-3917 (requiring executing officers to serve search warrants
during the daytime, unless the magistrate has included a nighttime search direction in the
warrant); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-08 (2006) (allowing executing officers to enter
unannounced if the issuing magistrate inserts a direction into the warrant allowing
unannounced entry); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)(E) (requiring executing officers to serve the
search warrant during the daytime, unless the magistrate finds reasonable cause for the warrant
to be executed at night).
160. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006).
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1. Protection from violence
One interest protected by the knock-and-announce rule,
according to the Hudson Court, is “the protection of human life and
limb.”161 The Court noted that the knock-and-announce rule helps
to prevent violence because “an unannounced entry may provoke
violence in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident.”162 The
Court had previously mentioned this purpose in Sabbath v. United
States when it noted that one facet of the rule is “to safeguard
officers, who might be mistaken, upon an unannounced intrusion
into a home, for someone with no right to be there.”163
Other courts have also held that the prevention of violence is one
of the primary reasons behind the knock-and-announce rule.164 An
unannounced entry is “conducive to violent confrontations between
the occupant and individuals who enter his home without proper
notice.”165 Announcement offers safety to both the residents of the
home as well as to the police executing the warrant.166 The rule
protects the residents of the home from unnecessary violence by
police and “reduces the risk [of injury] to innocent persons who may
be in the house at the time of the search.”167 It also protects police
from the violence of a resident reacting in self-defense.168

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968).
164. See, e.g., State v. Cardenas, 47 P.3d 127, 133 (Wash. 2002) (stating that one
purpose of the rule is “to reduce potential violence, which might arise from an unannounced
entry”).
165. Duke v. Superior Court, 461 P.2d 628, 633 (Cal. 1969).
166. Commonwealth v. Crompton, 682 A.2d 286, 288 (Pa. 1996) (“The purpose of the
knock and announce rule is to prevent violence and physical injury to the police and
occupants . . . .”); State v. Perry, 178 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (“[T]he rule
provides a form of protection from violence and assures the safety and security of both the
occupants of the dwelling and the officers executing the search warrant.”).
167. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1234.
168. See Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. 2001) (stating that one reason
why police are required to knock and announce is to “decrease the potential for a violent
response when a search is executed”); State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 782 (N.D. 1985)
(“[A]n unannounced entry by officers increases the potential for violence by provoking
defensive measures a surprised occupant would otherwise not have taken had he known that
the officers possessed a warrant to search his home.”); see also Josephson, supra note 17, at
1234 (“Unannounced entries put the officers involved at risk of being shot by frightened
homeowners.”).
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The protection from violence has also historically been cited as a
purpose of the prohibition against nighttime searches.169 “The rule
against unauthorized nighttime searches is . . . designed to protect
against the tumult and turmoil that attends entry of residences in the
dead of night.”170 The Oregon Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he
invasion of private premises in the small hours of the night smacks of
totalitarian methods and is more likely to create the terror that
precipitates gun battles.”171 Several courts have noted that a
nighttime invasion increases the likelihood of violence because an
invasion of the home is more alarming at night than during the
day.172 Nighttime searches cause “abrupt intrusions on sleeping
residents in the dark,”173 thereby increasing the likelihood of a
violent reaction from those inside the home.174
As with the knock-and-announce rule, the nighttime search rule
protects both residents and police.175 It protects residents because
“[f]ree from the scrutiny of potential witnesses and provided with
the cover of darkness, police officers may be tempted to use
unnecessary violence against the subject.”176 It also protects police
because “[p]erceiving that it is more difficult to protect oneself from
169. Even in pre-colonial England, the purpose of preventing violence was cited as a
reason for the prohibition of nighttime searches. See COOLEY, supra note 17, at 430 (“It is fit
that such warrants to search do express that search be made in the daytime; and though I do
not say they are unlawful without such restriction, yet they are very inconvenient without it; for
many times, under pretence of searches made in the night, robberies and burglaries have been
committed, and at best it creates a great disturbance.” (quoting Lord Hale in his treatise Pleas
of the Crown)).
170. CRIMINAL PRACTICE, supra note 120, § 24:7.
171. State v. Brock, 653 P.2d 543, 545 (Or. 1982); see also id. (“[T]he purpose of the
statute is to avoid the possibility of terror and gunplay which may arise from forcible nighttime
entries . . . .”).
172. See United States v. Smith, 340 F. Supp. 1023, 1029 (D. Conn. 1972) (“A knock at
the door is more alarming in the middle of the night, and it is no less so because the officer
knocking has a search warrant.”); Brock, 653 P.2d at 547 (stating that the rule “is concerned
with minimizing the heightened risks and apprehensions associated with a nighttime intrusion
into the home”).
173. United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1104 (1st Cir. 1989).
174. See Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Propriety of Execution of Search Warrant at
Nighttime, 41 A.L.R.5th 171, 233 (1996) (“Persons awakened from sleep may be confused
and overreact to an intrusion at night for this reason.”).
175. Id. (“[N]ighttime searches pose a greater danger to both the subject of the search
and law enforcement officials.”); see also Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304
(Mass. 1992) (stating that nighttime search warrants are disfavored because “nighttime police
intrusion . . . endanger[s] the police and slumbering citizens”).
176. Catalano, supra note 174, at 233.
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harm at night, or suffering from a more diffused fear of the dark, the
subject of the search may experience an increased level of discomfort
or apprehension and overreact to nighttime entry.”177
2. Protection of privacy and dignity
Another interest protected by the knock-and-announce rule, as
enumerated by the Hudson Court, is the protection of “those
elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden
entrance.”178 In Miller v. United States, the Court noted that the
knock-and-announce rule embodies “the reverence of the law for the
individual’s right of privacy in his house.”179 Although the residents
of the home do not have the right to refuse entrance to police
officers armed with a valid warrant, “the occupants of a house to be
searched have a privacy interest in activities not subject to the
warrant.”180 “Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright or
embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion.”181
Other federal and state courts have also listed the protection of
privacy as one of the primary purposes of the knock-and-announce
rule.182 The Fifth Circuit has stated that the knock-and-announce
rule “protect[s] people from unnecessary intrusion into their private
activities.”183 The Seventh Circuit noted that “[o]ne purpose of the
rule is to protect the privacy of the occupants and to give them an
opportunity to prepare for the agents’ entry.”184 The Minnesota
Supreme Court stated that “the purpose of the knock-and-announce
rule is to . . . protect against unnecessary shock and
embarrassment.”185 Legal commentators have also recognized the

177. Id.
178. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006).
179. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958).
180. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1235.
181. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (1963) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
182. See, e.g., State v. Sumpter, 563 S.E.2d 60, 61 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that a
purpose of the knock-and-announce requirement is “to protect people from unnecessary
intrusion into their private activities” (quoting State v. Harris, 551 S.E.2d 499, 506 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2001))); State v. Perry, 178 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (“[T]he rule
protects the privacy of the occupant living in the dwelling.”); State v. Cardenas, 47 P.3d 127,
133 (Wash. 2002) (stating that one purpose of the knock-and-announce requirement in
Washington law is “to protect an occupant’s right to privacy”).
183. United States v. Sagaribay, 982 F.2d 906, 909 (5th Cir. 1993).
184. Green v. Butler, 420 F.3d 689, 698 (7th Cir. 2005).
185. Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. 2001).
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privacy purpose of the knock-and-announce rule, as evidenced by the
statement of one commentator that the rule “guards individual
dignity” by giving the occupant of the home “a brief period of time
to compose oneself and prepare for an intrusion into the home.”186
The protection of privacy and dignity has also often been cited as
an interest protected by the nighttime search rule.187 It is widely
recognized by both courts and legal commentators that nighttime
searches inflict a greater invasion of privacy than do daytime
searches.188 The Second Circuit has noted that nighttime searches are
discouraged because of the “peculiar abrasiveness of official
intrusions at such periods.”189 A nighttime search is even more likely
to result in a violation of privacy and dignity than a daytime search
because “[a] search at night is more likely than a daytime search to
interrupt the activities of a personal nature more commonly
scheduled at that time.”190 This increased risk of violation of privacy
and dignity at night can also be inferred from the Supreme Court’s
statement in Richards v. Wisconsin that “[t]he brief interlude
between announcement and entry with a warrant may be the
opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of
bed.”191

186. E. Martin Estrada, A Toothless Tiger in the Constitutional Jungle: The “Knock and
Announce Rule” and the Sacred Castle Door, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 86 (2005)
(citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392 n.5 (1997)).
187. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (“[I]t is difficult to
imagine a more severe invasion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a private
home . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. 1992) (“The
underlying rationale [of the prohibition of nighttime searches] was that nighttime police
intrusion posed a great threat to privacy [and] violated the sanctity of home . . . .”); State v.
Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401, 410 (N.D. 1979) (“The purpose of [North Dakota’s nighttime
search statute] is to protect citizens from being subjected to the trauma of unwarranted
nighttime searches.”).
188. See, e.g., State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (“[E]ntry into a
residence in the middle of the night is a greater invasion of residential privacy than entry
during the daytime.” (quoting State v. Winchell, 363 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. 1985))); see
also supra note 120.
189. United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1201 (2d Cir. 1970).
190. Catalano, supra note 174, at 233.
191. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997) (discussing the reasons for the
knock-and-announce rule).
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3. Protection of property
The Hudson Court stated that a third interest protected by the
knock-and-announce rule was the “protection of property.”192 The
Court noted that the rule protected the property of the homeowner
because if police announce their identity and purpose, the
homeowner is given the opportunity to open the door and allow the
police to enter rather than the police breaking down the door or
otherwise damaging the home.193 The Court had previously
recognized this purpose in Richards v. Wisconsin, in which the Court
noted that an individual should “be provided the opportunity to
comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property
occasioned by a forcible entry.”194 Additionally, in Wilson v.
Arkansas, the Court stated that the knock-and-announce rule was
“justified in part by the belief that announcement generally would
avoid ‘the destruction or breaking of any house . . . by which great
damage and inconvenience might ensue . . . .’”195
Other courts, as well as legal commentators, have also noted the
purpose of protecting property.196 For example, the New York Court
of Appeals noted that announcement “serves the purpose of
providing the person with an opportunity to respond to the demand
for admittance, thus obviating the need for forcible entry.”197 Thus,
“the rule prevents needless destruction of property.”198 “[R]equiring
police to knock-and-announce before forcibly entering a residence
protects the homeowner’s property interests. A person should be
given the opportunity to voluntarily submit to a search before having
his property damaged.”199

192. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006).
193. Id.
194. Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5.
195. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 935–36 (1995) (quoting Semayne’s Case,
(1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 196 (K.B.)).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Sagaribay, 982 F.2d 906, 909 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that
the announcement rule of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 serves the purpose of “preventing unnecessary
destruction of private property”); State v. Harada, 41 P.3d 174, 184 (Haw. 2002) (stating that
one purpose of the rule is “to prevent unnecessary property damage”); Commonwealth v.
Morgan, 534 A.2d 1054, 1056 (Pa. 1987) (“The purpose of this ‘knock and announce’ rule
is . . . to prevent property damage resulting from forced entry.”).
197. People v. Payton, 380 N.E.2d 224, 231 (N.Y. 1978).
198. State v. Perry, 178 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005).
199. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1235 (footnote omitted).
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No courts have mentioned the protection of property as a
purpose of the nighttime search rule. Nevertheless, protection of
property can be viewed as a valid purpose of the prohibition of
nighttime searches. Case law and statutes allow executing officers to
break open windows or doors to effect a search warrant if they are
not admitted after a “reasonable time.”200 When police knock on the
door of a home during the daytime, there is a good chance that
someone in the home will be awake and can respond to the knock
within a reasonable time, thereby obviating the need for the police to
break down the door. At night, however, it is less likely that police
will get a timely response from the residents, even if those same
persons would have answered without delay during the daytime. The
reason for the delay is obvious: people who are awakened from their
sleep at night respond slower than people who are already awake
during the daytime. It may be argued that the reasonableness
standard requires police to wait longer at night than during the
daytime. Nevertheless, courts have found very short periods of
time—even as short as five seconds—to be reasonable wait times
before forceful entry is made in searches conducted during late night
and early morning hours that could be “nighttime hours” based on
the jurisdiction.201
200. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 808.6 (West 2003) (requiring executing officers to
announce their authority and purpose, but permitting the officers to break into a structure if
their “admittance has not been immediately authorized”); PA. R. CRIM. P. 207(B), (C)
(requiring an executing officer to wait for “a reasonable period of time” before forcibly
entering the premises); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33, 38–39 (2003) (holding that
police officers acted properly when they broke open the door of an apartment with a battering
ram only fifteen to twenty seconds after knocking and announcing, regardless of the fact that
the resident was in the shower at the time and did not hear the knock); United States v.
Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 372–74 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that police officers, who were
attempting to execute a search warrant at 6:00 a.m., had acted properly when they smashed
through the front door with a battering ram approximately one minute after knocking and
announcing). For a general discussion on the requirement that officers wait a “reasonable
time” before entering with force, see 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures §§ 243–44 (2000
& Supp. 2006).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 98-3183, 2000 WL 712385, at *4 (6th Cir.
May 24, 2000) (holding that a five-second wait before forcibly entering an apartment, during a
search warrant execution at 7:00 a.m., was reasonable); United States v. Knapp, 1 F.3d 1026,
1030–31 (10th Cir. 1993), cited in Randall v. State, 793 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that police officers waited a reasonable time when they broke down a door
with a battering ram after waiting only ten to twelve seconds when attempting to execute a
search warrant late at night). But see Randall, 793 So. 2d at 60 (holding that a ten-second wait
during a warrant execution between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. did not satisfy the knock-andannounce requirement).
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D. Summary of Comparisons

The comparisons of the two rules contained in the previous
Sections underscore the argument that the rationale of Hudson
should be extended to nighttime search violations. In Hudson and
the knock-and-announce cases that preceded it, the Supreme Court
looked to the early common law history, the statutory requirements,
and the purposes of the knock-and-announce rule in order to
determine if an unannounced search violated the Fourth
Amendment and, as a consequence, whether or not the evidence
should be excluded from subsequent criminal trials. Because the
nighttime search rule shares these same characteristics with the
knock-and-announce rule, the rationale of Hudson should be
extended to violations of the nighttime search rule. Thus, because of
the similarities between the two rules, the exclusionary rule should
not be used as a remedy for violations of either rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the exclusionary rule has been in existence in United
States jurisprudence for almost one hundred years, courts are still
struggling to decide when suppression of evidence is the correct
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. The Supreme Court
added some clarification when it held in Hudson v. Michigan that the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable when police violate the knock-andannounce rule. However, the propriety of using the exclusionary rule
in other contexts remains unclear, including the question of whether
or not suppression of evidence is the correct remedy for violations of
the nighttime search rule. Because the common law history, the
statutory codification, and the purposes of the two rules are virtually
identical, the Hudson holding should be extended to nighttime
search violations. Thus, evidence obtained by police during an
unauthorized nighttime search should not be suppressed in criminal
trials based on Fourth Amendment challenges to admissibility.
Jeffry R. Gittins
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